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Do ﬁrms use autonomy to motivate workers, or do they give autonomous jobs to workers
who are already especially motivated? A standard result in economics is that ﬁrms oﬀer
autonomous jobs to promote worker motivation. But surprisingly, little attention has been
given to the details of this practice of giving autonomy to especially motivated workers. In
contrast, ﬁndings from social psychology demonstrate that how people handle new information
is closely related to what motivates them. Does autonomy in fact trigger motivation? I argue
in this study that motivation may trigger autonomy, and thus that ﬁrms may beneﬁtf r o m
screening for intrinsically motivated workers. I assume that workers diﬀer in their degree
of motivation, and that motivated workers have a lower cost of processing information than
unmotivated ones. While motivated workers concentrate on searching for available information,
unmotivated ones focus on ignoring certain information as irrelevant. Therefore, ﬁrms would
gain eﬃciency from giving the more motivated workers a higher degree of autonomy. This link
between autonomy and motivation also has implications for non-monetary aspects of the job,
such as forms of leadership style and job design.
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11 Introduction
Do ﬁrms use autonomy to motivate workers? Or, do they give autonomy to workers who are
already especially motivated?
Earlier studies on motivation and autonomy focus on the conﬂict between two opposite
eﬀects: autonomy stimulates workers to acquire information; while employers lose control
over the outcome. This trade-oﬀ results in ﬁrms oﬀering autonomous jobs as a nonmonetary
incentive to promote worker motivation. But surprisingly, little attention has been given to
the details of the practice of giving autonomy to especially motivated workers. In contrast,
studies in social psychology show that job performance and how people handle new informa-
tion reﬂect their motives, drives, and emotions.1 One might think then that employees diﬀer
in their degree of motivation, and that employers are more likely to give the more motivated
workers a higher degree of autonomy.
What motivates people is a question that has been present in the psychology literature
f o ral o n gt i m e . D e c i( 1 9 7 1 )d e v e l o p e dt h ei d e at h a tp e o p l em i g h tb ed r i v e nb ym o t i v e s
that reﬂect their needs and goals. Deci called the resulting motivation intrinsic, in contrast
with what is known as extrinsic motivation or externally driven (by material rewards) be-
havior. Intrinsic motivation (IM hereafter) has also been introduced to the management
literature (see for example Galbraith, 1977 and Staw, 1989) as the motivation to perform
a certain task, or achieve speciﬁc outcomes. For example, professional pilots enjoy ﬂying,
while environmental workers ﬁght for clean nature. Galbraith and Staw argue that IM can
be stimulated by developing a work environment where people can achieve their goals, and
one way to do so is by providing autonomy. Autonomy, however, is a necessary, but not a
suﬃcient condition to induce better performance. Workers have to be interested in the task,
i.e., they have to be already motivated to do the job.
1See, for example, Pyszczynski and Greenberg (1987), Baumeister and Newman (1994).
2If workers are motivated or unmotivated, oﬀering autonomous jobs to unmotivated work-
ers will not necessarily stimulate them to be more motivated. Pyszczynski and Greenberg
(1987) and Baumeister and Newman (1994) show that a motivated worker is driven to search,
while an unmotivated worker is driven to ignore, i.e., motivated people have a lower cost of
processing information than unmotivated ones. Suppose, for example, that a ﬁrm needs a
study on the environmental impact of a new power plant. The ﬁrm has to decide whether
Peter or John will perform the study. Both employees have equal qualiﬁcations and expe-
rience. Peter is not only interested in environmental problems, but also does not miss an
opportunity to learn about the topic. His performance will be based on his motivation to
search all available sources. John, however, is indiﬀerent to those problems. He pays little
attention to environmental discussions. His performance will be based on his motivation to
ignore certain information as irrelevant. Therefore, the ﬁrm is better-oﬀ by delegating the
assignment to Peter.
I claim in this study that motivation may trigger autonomy, and that ﬁrms may beneﬁt
from screening for intrinsically motivated workers by oﬀering a choice between autonomous
and non-autonomous jobs. Motivated people show enthusiasm for acquiring information that
is useful for the production process. A motivated worker will believe that a certain way of
doing the job is the one that would bring the best results. He would therefore be discouraged
if asked to follow other alternatives. In an organization, where employees have no autonomy
in decision making, a motivated worker would need stronger incentives to work than an
unmotivated worker, who acquires no information about how best to get the job done. It
follows that the employer may ﬁnd it optimal to give autonomy to motivated workers, but
not to the unmotivated ones.
The observation that it is more costly to make people work on someone else’s idea than
their own is not novel. Zabojnik (1998, 2002) introduces this type of cost associated with
3centralization. However, he is not concerned with motivation, which is central here. My
contribution is the identiﬁcation of the eﬀect that motivation has on the optimal level of
decision-making authority, and the proposition of a screening device that ﬁrms can use to
identify motivated workers.
The interplay of autonomy and motivation also has implications for nonmonetary aspects
of the job, such as leadership style and job design. New evidence suggests that many US
companies have adopted new policies, frequently including greater decentralization.2 Non-
monetary aspects of the job have only recently started to attract some attention in economics.
In this light, the study contributes to the growing literature on personnel economics.
2R e l a t e d S t u d i e s
Workers’ motivation is largely ignored in the economics literature. The most common reason
is the standard assumption in microeconomics that eﬀort is costly and brings disutility.
But if intrinsically motivated people enjoy working, they will experience positive utility of
eﬀort. Such a result contradicts the aforementioned assumption.3 In contrast, ﬁndings from
psychology demonstrate that people may not always have an increasing cost of eﬀort. Classic
examples are experimental settings (Deci & Ryan, 1985) where participants perform tasks
without being rewarded.
Economists, however, do not entirely reject the idea of IM. Kreps (1997), for example,
w r i t e si nf a v o ro fI Ma n dt h es t y l i z e df a c tt h a tm o n e t a r yi n c e n t i v e sm a yi nf a c th a v ea
negative eﬀect on workers’ performance because they destroy their IM. He argues that since
strong empirical evidence in support of this fact is diﬃcult to ﬁnd, more research is needed
2See, e.g., Osterman (1994). Dessein (2002) cites that among the ﬁrms that have initiated more delega-
tion of decision rights in the 1990s are AT&T, General Electric, Eastman Kodak, Fiat, Motorola, United
Technologies, Xerox, and Ford.
3See Fehr and Falk (2001) on some critiques of bringing IM into the utility function.
4on the determinants of IM. The main critique is that it is hard to know whether what is
called IM is not just motivation triggered by extrinsic but fuzzy motivators. This paper
contributes by investigating the eﬀect of workers’ motivation on the ﬁrm’s choice of how
much autonomy employees should be given.
The initial studies on IM are attempts to deal with the possibility that monetary in-
centives might crowd-out IM (Frey 1997, Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997). The crowding
eﬀect has shifted the attention from deﬁning IM toward observing the link between IM and
monetary incentives.
An intuitive way of introducing IM is through disutility of eﬀort. Delfgaauw and Dur
(2002) model IM as an argument in the utility function. In equilibrium, motivated workers
work harder and accept lower wages than unmotivated workers. Their model, however, has
no implications for autonomy and the relation between autonomy and motivation.
A more elaborate study of motivation is Benabou & Tirole (2002), who oﬀer an economic
and cognitive perspective to IM. They propose a model where the employer has private
information about the worker’s ability or nature of the task. The worker receives a signal
from observing the employer’s decision. He interprets the signal and concludes what his
own motivation is based on this interpretation.4 Therefore, when the worker receives an
autonomous job, he might think that the employer trusts him or values his work, and thus
that he is highly motivated. The implication is that autonomy inspires motivation.
There are very few studies generating the prediction that autonomy is oﬀered to workers
who are already motivated. Murdock (2002) employs the idea that people are motivated by
the outcomes of their work (Staw, 1989). Consider, for example, the personal satisfaction
achieved from introducing a new medicine. Murdock calls these outcomes intrinsic returns
4Formally, this approach is an application of the psychological theory of self-perception developed by Bem
(1967, 1972). According to the self-perception theory individuals do not have information about their own
motives. Instead, they have to infer them from the circumstances under which the activity takes place.
5(for the worker). A motivated worker would choose to participate in a project with high
intrinsic returns. Such a project might bring ﬁnancial loss. The employer, however, can
still gain because the worker would work harder on this and on other projects as well.
What is important is that the total surplus (intrinsic plus ﬁnancial return) from all projects
is positive. The implication of this model, which is similar to my line of study, is that
motivated workers are given autonomy to pursue intrinsic returns. In contrast to Murdock,
I assume that there is heterogeneity in information processing among workers. Also, I model
explicitly the process of autonomy delegation and show that it is optimal for the employer
to screen for motivated workers.
I turn next to the literature on autonomy and decision rights. The main observation
in this literature is that autonomy is determined by the structure of information. A study
that is closely related to the present paper is Aghion and Tirole (1997), who investigate the
two-way interaction between authority5 and information. Authority gives autonomy, which
in turn stimulates the initiative to acquire information, but usually comes with some costs.
Employers lose control over decision making. Losses of information are also possible. Aghion
and Tirole’s model presents a general framework for introducing autonomy and has certain
implications for delegation of decision rights. It does not, however, deal with motivation and
heterogeneity in information processing.
My idea in this paper is closer to the innovative activities argument: a motivated worker
in an autonomous job has the opportunity to work on his own idea and would be more
certain of and have more faith in the outcome of the project. A motivated employee also
h a sal o w e rc o s to fp r o c e s s i n gi n f o r m a t i o n . A nunmotivated worker, on the other hand, is
indiﬀerent to the type of project he has to work on and has a higher cost of processing
information. Therefore, it is more eﬃcient for the employers to give more motivated people
5Where ”real authority” is deﬁned as the ”eﬀective control over decisions in organizations.”
6a higher degree of autonomy. That is, oﬀering autonomous jobs to unmotivated workers will
not necessarily stimulate them to be more motivated: motivation triggers autonomy, but not
vice versa.
3 Motivation May Trigger Autonomy
Studies from the literature on autonomy and delegation have developed the argument that
autonomy triggers motivation. However, one might also think that employees just diﬀer in
their degree of IM, and that employers are more likely to give the more motivated workers
a higher degree of autonomy. In this section, I present a theory to that eﬀect. The model is
an application of Zabojnik (1998, 2002),6 whose original model I employ and extend for my
study of motivation.
Consider a framework with a risk-neutral principal (she) and a risk-averse agent (he). The
principal maximizes her expected proﬁt and provides the agent with at least his reservation
utility, zero by assumption. The agent’s utility is additively separable in money and cost
of eﬀort, u(wage)-cost of eﬀort,w h e r eu(.) is strictly concave and diﬀerentiable, u0(.) > 0,
u00(.) < 0.
The agent is hired to work on one of two alternative projects, j =1 ,2, which are mutually
exclusive. After a project is chosen, he decides on the provision of eﬀort. Eﬀort can be high
(eh)o rl o w( el) and cannot be observed by the principal. The disutility of the high level of
eﬀort is denoted by H, H>0.
The payoﬀs of the project depend on the state of the world and the agent’s eﬀort. There
are two equally probable states of the world, s =1 , 2. Project j is successful and brings
payoﬀ V> 0 if and only if s = j and the agent provides suﬃcient eﬀort. When s 6= j or
eﬀort is too low (el), the payoﬀ is normalized to zero. Another interpretation of this set-up
6Zabojnik (1998) is an earlier version of Zabojnik (2002).
7is that the appropriate technology of production has to be chosen for achieving a speciﬁc
outcome.
The agent and the principal have diﬀerent abilities to determine the correct way to
complete the project. After Nature determines the state s, the principal and the agent receive
independent signals (they do not observe each others’ signals) about this particular state of
the world, rprincipal and ragent respectively. Let Pr(ragent = s| s)=p and Pr(rprincipal = s|
s)=q, 1
2 <p , q<1, be the probabilities that the agent and the principal receive a
signal indicating the true state. Therefore, for any signal received, the agent believes that










q+(1−q) = q. The prior probability of 1
2 and the precision
of the signals are common knowledge.
Since the agent’s eﬀort is not observable, his wage depends on the outcome of the project.
There are two possible arrangements of decision-making authority: centralization and de-
centralization. Let the wage be denoted with wi
c under centralization and wi
d under decen-




k,k∈ {c,d} can be interpreted as a bonus paid when the project is successful, where
w
f
k is a base salary.
The timing of the model is as follows. The principal proposes a contract that allocates the
authority over the future choice of projects and the agent’s compensation. The agent accepts
or refuses the contract. The contract maximizes the principal’s ex ante expected proﬁta n d
provides the agent with an expected utility, which is at least his reservation utility. Nature
determines the state of the world, s. The parties receive imprecise and independent signals
about s. The controlling party chooses a project. If the project is successful, it brings a
payoﬀ V> 0 for the principal and a payment ws
k, where k ∈ {c,d}, for the agent. In case of
8failure, the project’s payoﬀ is normalized to zero, and the agent receives payoﬀ w
f
k.
3.1 Benchmark Model with No Moral Hazard
As a point of reference, I start the analysis with the benchmark model when the agent’s
eﬀort is observed. In this case, the principal oﬀers a constant wage w, conditional on the
agent making a high eﬀort; w satisﬁes the agent’s participation constraint, w − H > 0. The
principal will choose a wage that gives the agent exactly his reservation utility, w − H = u.
Under decentralization, the agent will pick the project that the signal suggests is best suited
for him. The probability of success being p, the principal’s expected proﬁti sπd = pV −u−H.
Using similar arguments, the probability of success is q under centralization, so that πc =
qV − u − H. Ac o m p a r i s o nb e t w e e nπd and πc shows that centralization is preferred to
decentralization when the principal’s signal is better than the agent’s, i.e., when q>p .
In the opposite case, when the agent receives a better signal, p>q ,decentralization is
preferred. I show next that this result does not hold when the principal cannot observe the
agent’s eﬀort.
3.2 Analysis of Centralization and Decentralization
3.2.1 Centralization
The principal is responsible for the choice of project under centralization. She does not
consult with the agent and might incur a higher cost of enforcing her action if the agent’s
eﬀort is unobservable. Upon observation of the principal’s choice, the agent forms a posterior
belief about the probability of success. He infers the principal’s signal from observing the
chosen project. Because of symmetry, I will limit the discussion to the case when the principal
chooses project one, j =1 .
9Two possible scenarios exist under centralization. If the agent and the principal receive
the same signal, the agent’s posterior belief is denoted by p(1,1), where p(1,1) =
pq
pq+(1−p)(1−q).
He feels optimistic and the principal does not need to provide additional incentives. When
the signals are diﬀerent, the agent’s posterior belief is p(1,2) =
q(1−p)
q(1−p)+p(1−q), where p(1,1) >
p(1,2), and p(1,1) >p ; the agent is pessimistic and will need stronger incentives to provide
high eﬀort. Hence, the principal faces two diﬀerent optimization problems.
When the principal and the agent receive diﬀerent signals, the payment to the agent in
case of success, ws
c, needs to be high enough, so that he will provide eﬀort regardless of his
posterior belief. This scenario is named the full incentive scenario. The principal maximizes
her expected proﬁt π = q(V − ws











c) − H > u(w
f
c)( I C 1 )
where (IR1) is the agent’s ex ante participation constraint. (IC1) is the incentive compati-
bility constraint.
When the two signals coincide, the agent will always provide eﬀo r t ,a n dt h i si st h e
partial incentive scenario. The principal’s optimization problem transforms to maximizing
π =( pq)(V − ws











c) − H > u(w
f
c)( I C 2 )
The proﬁt function and the participation constraint depend on both the principal’s and
the agent’s quality of information.
103.2.2 Decentralization
The principal delegates the decision-making authority to the agent under decentralization.
The agent’s belief p does not depend on the signal received by the principal. Thus, the
problem arising under centralization when the agent develops pessimism does not occur
here. However, the principal might sustain an information loss if she is better informed.
She maximizes her expected proﬁt πd = p(V − ws
d) − (1 − p)w
f











d) − H > u(w
f
d)( I C 3 )
The main idea of the model is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: (Zabojnik 1998) Holding all other parameters ﬁxed, there exists a value p∗,
p∗ <q , such that decentralization is preferred to centralization for all p>p ∗.
When the action taken by the agent can be observed, decentralization is oﬀered if and
only if the agent is better informed than the principal and p > q. Otherwise, centralization
dominates. However, if the agent has to work on the principal’s idea while he originally
believes that his idea is the proper way to proceed, he will be more pessimistic about the
outcome. The agent would then need a stronger incentive to participate in the employment
agreement and the principal must oﬀer a larger bonus. Since risk-aversion is assumed, the
expected wage has to increase to compensate for the higher uncertainty. As a result, an
additional cost is associated with centralized decision-making.
I present next an extension to Zabojnik’s model that formally introduces motivation
along with the problem of centralization and decentralization.
113.3 Motivated and Unmotivated Workers
In the above model, the agent receives a signal that improves his information about which
project is likely to be successful. In what follows, this is the motivated worker, who pays
attention to new information, forms ideas, etc. One may think that there is heterogeneity in
information processing. I deﬁne an unmotivated worker as someone who does not process any
new information about the project. Under decentralization, an unmotivated worker forms a
posterior belief equal to 1/2, while under centralization he only knows that the principal is
right with probability q.
To focus on the eﬀect of heterogeneity in information processing, I assume equal costs of
eﬀort. Both motivated and unmotivated agents have the same ability to acquire information
and place the same cost on eﬀort once they know the project. The only diﬀerence between
them is how they process information. While a motivated worker concentrates on searching
for available information, an unmotivated one focuses on ignoring certain information as
irrelevant.7 I set up next the principal’s optimization problem when she deals with an
unmotivated agent.
Under centralization, the principal maximizes her expected proﬁt πe
c = q(V −ws
c)−(1−
q)wf










c) − H > u(w
f
c)( I C 1 e x t )
The above optimization problem is equivalent to minimizing the agent’s expected wage
7The assumption that both agents have the same cost eﬀort does not contradict the fact that they process
information diﬀerently. In this model, an unmotivated agent holds the same probability of success of the
project even after observing the signal. One interpretation of this eﬀect is that the agent eﬀectively gets
no signal, or a poor signal. This interpretation, however, seems to contradict the assumption that the two




c +( 1− q)wf
c. The incentive compatibility constraint (IC1ext) implies
the participation constraint (IR1ext). In addition, (IC1ext) should be binding. Otherwise,
ws
c can be decreased, and thus increasing the objective function, without jeopardizing the
constraint. If (IR1ext)w e r en o tb i n d i n g ,b o t hws
c and wf
c could be decreased, which would
keep (IC1ext)u n a ﬀected. Thus, (IR1ext) has to be binding as well. Since both constraints















The expected utility of an unmotivated agent is EUe
c = qH
q +( 1− q)0 − H =0 .



























d) − H > u(w
f
d)( I C 2 e x t )
This is equivalent to the above maximization problem with q = 1
2. In other words, decen-
tralization is a special case of centralization, where the principal receives an uninformative
signal and assigns equal probabilities of success regardless of the state that occurs.










20−H =0 . Therefore, an unmotivated agent gets the same expected utility
under both centralization and decentralization and would be indiﬀerent between these two
set-ups.
It is reasonable to think that the principal would delegate centralization to an unmo-
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Figure 1: Optimal Contracts
pessimism, centralization dominates decentralization because it improves the quality of in-
formation and thereby the probability of success.






be the contract oﬀered to an unmotivated agent, where ws
u and wf
u are the wages un-
der success and failure and δu = C indicates centralization. The principal’s proﬁt:
π(q)=q(V − ws
c) − (1 − q)wf
c is an increasing function of q.
Corollary: Let qD =1 /2a n dqC > 1/2b et h ev a l u e so fq for an unmotivated agent un-
der decentralization and centralization respectively. Centralization always dominates
decentralization.










c = g(0), and g = u−1(.). See proofs
of Proposition 2 and Corollary in Appendix.
I have determined the optimal contracts when motivation is observable. The results are
presented on Figure 1. An unmotivated agent will be oﬀered centralization for all parameter
14values of q. For a motivated agent, based on the observability of eﬀort, there are two cases.
When eﬀort is observable, he will be oﬀered decentralization for all parameter values of p such
that p>q .W h e ne ﬀort is not observable, he will be oﬀered decentralization for all parameter
values of p such that p>p ∗,w h e r ep∗ <q .Or, the principal oﬀers decentralization to a




























































In the next section, I discuss delegation of autonomy when motivation is unobservable.
3.4 Screening Among Motivated and Unmotivated Workers
The principal may not observe the agent’s level of motivation. Still she may want to take
advantage of the diﬀerence in information processing. This is true especially when the agent













,w h e r eδm, δu ∈ {C,D}.8
The contracts derived under full information about agents’ types would not screen when
the type is not observable. Two observations are suﬃcient. First, a motivated agent would
always choose the contract designed for an unmotivated agent. After observing the principal’s
decision of a project, a motivated agent has the beneﬁt of determining his action. The
extra choice increases his utility. Thus, the agent’s expected utility is always higher than
8C stays for centralization, and D for decentralization,
15his reservation utility. Second, he will expend eﬀort only if his signal coincides with the
principal’s signal. Under a centralized contract, he can choose when to expend eﬀort. The
principal needs another solution to the adverse selection problem. Two main options of a
screening mechanism exist:
Option 1: Oﬀer only centralized contracts. This option can be executed by: i) inducing
high eﬀort under full incentives; ii) inducing high eﬀort under partial incentives; or iii)
inducing high eﬀort for a motivated agent, but make an unmotivated agent participate as
well.
Option 2: Oﬀer one centralized and one decentralized contract.
If the principal chooses to induce high eﬀort under full incentives, the incentive constraint
is based on p(1,2), and both types of agents expend high eﬀort. For a motivated agent, this
contract coincide with CENT(Mfull), which is designed such that he provides eﬀort and
gets his zero reservation utility. An unmotivated agent provides eﬀort because q>p (1,2),
and he also gets his zero reservation utility.
If the principal chooses to induce high eﬀort under partial incentives, such that an unmo-
tivated agent always expends eﬀort, but a motivated agent expends eﬀort only if his signal
coincides with the principal’s signal, her expected proﬁti sπe
c = qφ(V − ws
c) − (1 − qφ)wf
c,
where φ = 1















c) − H > u(w
f
c)( I C 4 )
(IR4.1) is equivalent to pqu(ws
c)+( 1− pq)u(wf
c) > H, since [pq +( 1− p)(1 − q)]H 6
H. (IC4) holds for p(1,1) as well, since q<p (1,1). Using similar logic as in the previous
section, the two constraints (IR4) and (IC4) hold with equality at the optimum. Therefore,




Finally, the principal may choose to induce high eﬀort for a motivated agent under partial
incentives, but make an unmotivated agent participate with low eﬀort. Her expected proﬁt
is πe
c = φq(V − ws
c) − (1 − φq)wf










c) − H > u(w
f
c). (IC5)
An unmotivated agent would not provide eﬀort since (IC5) holds for p(1,1) and the








The equilibrium outcomes under Option 1 coincide with the wages paid under the three
centralized contracts designed under full information about the agent’s type. It is unclear
which contract is optimal because the principal’s proﬁt depends on the proportion of moti-
vated agents. I have shown in the previous section that a menu of these contracts cannot be
employed as a screening mechanism.
If the principal choses centralization, she can always induce a motivated agent to expend
high eﬀort by oﬀering full incentives. In this case, however, she would pay a higher wage to
an unmotivated agent than under partial incentives. When the proportion of unmotivated
workers is large, the cost increases even more. Nevertheless, oﬀering only centralized con-
tracts has one beneﬁt: when the principal is better informed than the agent, she can use
her information. If the principal’s beneﬁt from using her own information is high enough,
it may be able to outweigh the cost of paying a higher wage to an unmotivated agent. The
principal faces a trade-oﬀ between achieving better utilization of information and paying
higher wages.
I proceed further by showing that screening is possible only under Option 2. Proposition








,j∈ {m,u}, δj ∈ {C,D}
o
be a contract designed for
a motivated agent when j = m and for an unmotivated agent when j = u.T h e r ee x i s t













When the menu oﬀers only centralized contracts, the only diﬀerence between them is
in the wages. Hence, the agents would mimic each other and choose the contract that
oﬀers a higher wage. This behavior will result in a pooling equilibrium. Therefore, two
centralized contracts won’t help the principal in the process of screening between motivated
and unmotivated agents.
Let us suppose that the principal oﬀers one centralized and one decentralized contract,
where the latter is designed for a motivated agent. Also, let the wages depend on the agents’
information p such that both agents get utility H
p when the project succeeds and a zero utility
when it fails.9
Although p>1/2, an unmotivated agent does not receive any new information under
centralization and p =1 /2 for him. Thus, when the project succeeds, an unmotivated
agent gets a higher utility ( H
1/2 > H
p ) than a motivated agent. Since under centralization
the agent’s expected utility depends on the principal’s information q, and q>1/2, an
unmotivated agent’s expected utility is positive. His incentive constraint requires that the
diﬀerence between the two utilities, under success and failure, be at least H
p (see IC1ext).
With the current contract this diﬀerence is H
1/2 and the incentive constraint is satisﬁed.
To assure that screening occurs, the principal should provide incentive for a motivated
agent to choose the decentralized contract. The principal may oﬀer a small increase in the
wage, ε, to both agents, such that ε > 0 if the agent is strictly better informed than the
principal (p>q )a n dε = 0 otherwise. Formally, the small increase would be a part of
9This is the equilibrium outcome under DEC(M).
18the wage for both agent. However, for an unmotivated agent, the condition that assures a
positive increase never holds, and thus such an increase would be given to a motivated agent
only. In addition, ε has to be speciﬁed such that a motivated agent gets a higher expected
utility under the decentralized contract than under the centralized one. Thus, it insures that
a motivated agent would pick the contract designed for him.
4 Conclusions
The interplay of autonomy and motivation aﬀects the output and division of labor. Au-
tonomy, however, is a necessary but not a suﬃcient condition on improved performance. I
assume that workers diﬀer in their degree of motivation, they are just motivated or unmoti-
vated. Oﬀering autonomous jobs to unmotivated workers will not necessarily stimulate them
to be more motivated. I further assume that motivated people have a lower cost of processing
information than unmotivated ones. Based on these assumptions, I argue that motivation
may trigger autonomy, and thus that ﬁrms would beneﬁt from screening for intrinsically
motivated workers by oﬀering autonomous jobs.
One other concern that deserves a detailed discussion is the relation between motivation
and ability. Is it possible that what I call motivation is actually ability? If motivated people
like to work on their own ideas, then it is relevant to ask whether motivation depends on
ability. Unfortunately, both motivation and ability are unobservable characteristics. In cases
like this, economics can only beneﬁtf r o man e wt y p eo fd a t at h a ta s k sq u e s t i o n sa b o u tt h e
work environment, workers’ habits and motivation, norms of the workplace, and network
eﬀects.
The relation between autonomy and motivation also has implications for nonmonetary
aspects of the job, such as leadership style and job design. Some evidence from the business
literature demonstrates that managers treat autonomy as a job dimension that promotes
19high internal work motivation. If it is true that autonomy complements motivation, more
experimental evidence is needed.
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215 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2:
It follows from (IC1ext)t h a tq[u(ws
c)−u(wf
c)] > H,o rws
c >w f
c. The (IR1ext)c o n s t r a i n t
must be binding. Assume it does not bind, and decrease both ws
c and wf
c by some small
amount ε > 0. Since ws
c >w f
c, and u is concave, (IC1ext) is relaxed by this decrease and








The principal’s proﬁti sπ(q)=q(V −ws
c)− (1−q)wf
c = q(V −g(H
q ))− (1−q)g(0). The
ﬁrst derivative of the proﬁt function is ∂π
∂q = V −[g(H
q )− H
q g0(H




q ). From the Lagrange’s theorem, if g is continuos in [0, H
q ]a n dd i ﬀerentiable in (0, H
q ),
then there is a value η, η ∈ [0, H




q −0 . Thus, g(H
q ) − g(0) = H
q g0(η)
and ∂π
∂q = V − H
q g0(η)+H
q g0(H
q )=V + H
q [g0(H
q )−g0(η)]. Since g = u−1(.),g 0(H
q )−g0(η) > 0.
Thus, ∂π
∂q > 0 for all parameter values of q.
Proof of Corollary:
The principal’s expected proﬁt under centralization is πC = q(V − g(H
q )) − (1 − q)g(0),
while under decentralization πD = 1
2(V − g(H
q )) − (1 − 1
2)g(0). Since π(q)i sa ni n c r e a s i n g
function of q from Proposition 2, πC − πD = π(q) − π(1
2) > 0, where q>1
2.













be a menu of contracts such that both contracts are












, her optimization problem is
to maximize her expected proﬁt( µ is the proportion of motivated workers):
22µ[pq(V − w
s
m) − (1 − pq)w
f
m]+( 1− µ)[q(V − w
s
u) − (1 − q)w
f
u],




















































IR(M)a n dIR(U) are the participation constraints for a motivated and an unmo-
tivated worker respectively. IC1(M)a n dIC2(M) are the standard incentive constraints






.I n a s i m i l a r w a y , IC1(U) is the standard incentive constraint for an unmo-






. I assign numbers (1)
through (7) to the constraints for convenience. It is easy to notice that (1) and (7) to-














q , but since q>p (1,2) (4) and (7) together imply (6). Therefore, the new

































IC1(M) implies that u(ws
m)−u(wf
m) > H







I will next proof that the expected utilities of the two types of agents are the same. Using this
observation, I will show that u(ws
u) − u(wf
u) > H
















contracts coincide, and the optimization
problem is characterized by a polling equilibrium.
Assume that a motivated and an unmotivated agent have diﬀerent expected utilities.
Since both contracts are speciﬁed under centralization, the only diﬀerence is in the wage.
Therefore, an unmotivated agent would always prefer to mimic a motivated agent when the
latter gets a higher wage, and vice versa. A motivated agent prefers to present himself as
unmotivated if he would receive a higher wage. As a result, the two expected utilities are
equivalent, or EU = qu(ws
m)+( 1− q)u(wf
m) − H = qu(ws
u)+( 1− q)u(wf
u) − H and (7) is
binding.
Let A ≡ u(ws
u) − u(wf
u)a n dB ≡ u(ws
m) − u(wf
m). Consider the following possibilities: i)
A> H
p(1,2) and B = H
p(1,2).I fA is decreased and the expected utility, EU, is kept constant, all
constraints are satisﬁed. (7) is satisﬁed because the EU is constant, (4) slacks, (1) and (2)
are not aﬀected by the change and are satisﬁed as well. Therefore, the principal’s expected
24proﬁt increases and the original mechanism is not optimal; ii) A = H
p(1,2) and B> H
p(1,2).
If B is decreased and the EU is kept constant, (2) and (4) slack and the principal’s proﬁt
increases; and iii) A> H
p(1,2) and B> H
p(1,2). Using a similar argument, the principal’s
expected proﬁti n c r e a s e s .
The above proof shows that A = H
p(1,2) and B = H
p(1,2), or that the diﬀerence in the
utilities under success and failure is the same for a motivated and an unmotivated agent.
Since the expected utilities are the same as well, it follows that the wages are the same and


























for an unmotivated agent. The principal’s




m) − (1 − p)w
f
m]+( 1− µ)[q(V − w
s
u) − (1 − q)w
f
u]










m) − H > u(w
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u) − H > u(w
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(10)a n d( 4 0) are the participation constraints for a motivated and an unmotivated agent
respectively. (20) is the standard incentive constraint for a motivated agent, while (30) ensures






.I nas i m i l a rw a y ,( 5 0) is the standard incentive

















b eam e n uo fc o n t r a c t ss u c ht h a tε >
2(1−p)(2q−1)





is designed for a motivated agent such that the diﬀerence in utilities under success and fail-
ure for a motivated agent is u(ws
m) − u(wf
m)=H
p + ε. Hence, this contract diﬀers from the
contract designed for a motivated agent under full information about the agent’s motivation
by the increase in the wage in case of success, ε. Constraint (1’) holds with equality when
ε =0 . C o n s t r a i n t( 2 ’ )h o l d ss i n c eu(ws
m)−u(wf
m)=H
p +ε > H
p . The additional wage, which
exists only when the agent is strictly better informed than the principal, serves as an incen-
tive that prevents a motivated agent from choosing the centralized contract. The condition
ε >
2(1−p)(2q−1)
p is derived such that a motivated agent gets a higher expected utility under






is designed for an unmotivated agent. The payment
in case of success can also be interpreted as g(H
p ), and with p = 1
2 for an unmotivated agent,
g(H
p )=g( H





1/2 −H =( 2 q−1)H>0s i n c eq>1
2.I n( 5 ’ )u(ws
u)−u(wf
u) > H





q . (6’) holds from q>1
2. Thus, all constraints (4’)-(6’) are satisﬁed.





.U n d e rt h i s
contract a motivated agent gets a higher wage only when he is better informed. Otherwise,
the outcome coincides with the outcome under the contract designed for a motivated agent
under full information about the agent’s motivation.






which oﬀers a higher expected wage than the contract designed for an unmotivated agent
under full information about the agent’s motivation. This result suggests that in industries
26where the principal expects to choose from a pool of predominantly unmotivated agents, she
m i g h tb eb e t t e ro ﬀ by oﬀering
³
g(H
q ),g(0),C
´
only.
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